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Predictions derived from a principal-agent analysis of the manufacturer-retailer relationship are
derived and tested using microdata on contractual form, outlet characteristics and retail prices
for gasoline stations in Eastern Massachusetts. The empirical results are consistent with
upstream firms choosing contracts that have strong incentive characteristics but less direct
control when asset characteristics make unobservable effort by downstream agents important.
Manufacturers trade-off incentive power for more direct control when observable effort is
relatively more important. Retail prices are affected by the identity of the decisionmaker and
are slightly lower when the upstream firm is allowed to directly control the retail price.

1. INTRODUCTION
Vertical restraints have a long and controversial literature in the economics of antitrust
policy. They have a shorter but less controversial literature in positive economic theory'. In
this latter literature, vertical agreements are analyzed as a response to principal-agent problems.
The upstream firm sells its output to self-interested downstream agents for transformation and
resale. In the absence of contractual restraints, the agents' choices of price and/or quality often
will not be in the best interest of the upstream principal. The purpose of the contract is to align
the interests of the agent with the interests of the principal.
There is a modest empirical literature addressing this view of vertical contracts2.
Brickley and Dark (1984) investigate the effect of monitoring costs and reputation investment
on the upstream firm's decision to operate downstream units as franchises rather than company-
owned outlets. They find patterns consistent with franchising to economize on monitoring costs
by establishing the franchisee as a residual claimant at remote outlets and with company
ownership when the downstream firm has an incentive to free-ride on the reputation of the
upstream firm. Lafontaine (1988) and Norton (1988) also report results suggesting that
monitoring costs and moral hazard affect the choice between franchising and company
ownership. Ornstein and Hanssens (1987) find evidence that industry-wide resale price
maintenance agreements increase the retail price of distilled spirits.
Although previous empirical studies have addressed the choice of price or contractual
form made for each outlet, they have in general been hampered by a paucity of outlet-level data.
As a result, they have relied on variation in industry or market averages to estimate a
relationship between characteristics and contractual form. In general, the studies test for a
relationship between the industry proportion of outlets operated under some contractual form and
some set of industry characteristics. The theory invoked by these studies, however, makes no
1 The positive theory of vertical restraints is summarized in Tirole (1988) and Katz (1989).
For a more institutional application of principal agent theory to franchising see Rubin (1978).
2 There is a related empirical literature on the effect of asset specificity, or the potential for
ex post rent extraction by some party to the agreement, on contract choices. See, for example,
Joskow (1987). The contracting problem addressed in this paper does not involve relationship
specific assets.
prediction about proportions. Indeed, in the absence of important (and unobserved)
heterogeneity across outlets, no mix of contractual form should be observed'3.
This study is an empirical test of the implications of principal-agent theory in which
outlet-specific data appropriate to the theoretical predictions are used. Data on an outlet's
characteristics, its retail prices and the contract under which it is managed are used to examine
the relationships among the outlet characteristics, the upstream firm's choice of contracts, and
the agent's choice of retail price. One focus of the study is the upstream firm's choice of the
allocation of control rights (contractual form) as a function of the characteristics of the
downstream asset. Thus, the observed mix in contractual form is tied to observed heterogeneity
in outlet characteristics. A second focus is the effect of contractual form on the agent's choice
of retail price conditional on asset characteristics. Differences in retail prices are tied to
differences in characteristics and the incentives embodied in the contractual form.
The application addressed here is gasoline retailing, and the study exploits the facts that
principals (refiners) sell gasoline through variously configured stations and use several
contractual forms. Variation in station characteristics lead to variation in the importance of
agent effort and the extent to which the relevant effort is observable to the principal. Because
an unconstrained agent generally will not choose the level of effort preferred by the principal,
contractual forms with strong performance incentives will be used at stations where effort is
important and unobservable. At stations where effort is observable, the refiner may choose a
contractual form that allows more direct control over observable effort but offers weaker
performance incentives.
Legal constraints on contracting on price make the price and effort problems asymmetric.
Price is always observable, but can be directly chosen by the upstream firm only at a company-
owned outlet where providing incentives for unobservable effort may be more difficult. Holding
constant the quality of the product, retail prices will be affected by whether they are chosen by
the upstream or downstream firm. Because agents will generally not chose the price that
3 Gallini and Lutz (1990) develop a signaling model in which a choice variable for the
upstream firm is the proportion of company-owned stores in the distribution network, and
Lafontaine (1990) presents some related empirical results. The standard principal-agent theory
invoked in this paper and in the bulk of the empirical work, however, requires outlet-level
heterogeneity to support a mix of contractual forms.
maximizes upstream profit, the advantage of direct control over price may offset concerns with
unobservable quality.
These predictions are tested using data from a census of stations in Eastern Massachusetts
that include information on over 1100 branded stations. Consistent with the theory, prices
appear to be different--slightly lower--at company-owned outlets. Station configurations that
imply output is sensitive to unobservable effort increase the probability that a contractual form
with strong effort incentives will be chosen. Conversely, configuring stations such that output
is more sensitive to observable quality increases the probability that a contractual form granting
quality control to the upstream firm will be chosen.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of decision-making within
a vertical structure when there are institutional and informational constraints on contracting. The
implications of this model for the choice of contractual form and retail price in gasoline retailing
are discussed in Section 3. The empirical work is presented in Section 4, and concluding
comments are offered in Section 5.
2. A MODEL OF VERTICAL DECISION-MAKING
This section outlines a model of vertical decision-making when some downstream choices
cannot be covered by contract. The model is first presented in a general principal-agent
framework and then, in Section 3, applied to the problem of gasoline manufacturers and
retailers. The empirical work addresses only the choices of retail price and contractual form,
but interpretation is facilitated by considering the context in which they are made. Thus, the
model also examines asset characteristics and effort choices.
The problem facing the vertical structure can be analyzed as a three stage game. In the
first stage, the upstream firm chooses the characteristics of the downstream asset that will
maximize upstream profit given market conditions and subsequent play. In the second, it
chooses the contract that will induce preferred behavior by the downstream firm conditional on
the asset's characteristics. Finally, the downstream agent under contract to manage the asset
chooses effort and retail price to maximize her utility given market conditions and the decisions
of the upstream firm.
The agent's problem is to choose the effort level (e) and retail price (p) that will
maximize her utility given the market conditions she faces, the characteristics of the asset she
manages and the contractual restraints on her choices. Competition in the downstream market
is assumed to be imperfect. Otherwise, her price and effort choices would be market-driven
with no role for contractual restraints.' Some of her choices may be specified by contract, but
some cannot be. In particular, some dimensions of effort are assumed to be unobservable by
the principal'. Let e = (e',e2 ), where e' is observable and e2 is not. Retail price is observable,
but laws against resale price maintenance will disallow contracting on price in some
circumstances.
Both price and product quality are observed by the consumer, and demand for the product
decreases in price and increases in quality6. Quality is a function of asset characteristics and
agent effort; given asset characteristics, quality increases in effort. Different assets produce
different products, and these products vary in the extent to which their quality is affected by
effort. Let X = (X',X2) index asset characteristics such that an increase in X denotes an
increased sensitivity of product quality to effort. Then an increase in X' (X2) denotes an increase
in the sensitivity of quality to observable (unobservable) effort.
The agent's utility is assumed to increase in profit and decline in effort. Letting 0




where U(*) is the agent's utility and e is the monetary disutility of effort. Assuming the X and 0
offered by the upstream firm in a take-it-or-leave-it contract allow the agent to achieve at least
her reservation utility level, the solution to this problem is the utility-maximizing effort and
SThis assumption is consistent with the application to gasoline retailing. Gasoline stations
are sufficiently differentiated by location and brand to have some discretion in price and effort.
See, for example, Slade (1986).
5 For simplicity, choices are characterized as simply observable or unobservable. In fact,
choices may be observable but at a high cost or observable but not verifiable.
6 Quality is either unobservable to the upstream firm or is a sufficiently noisy indicator of
effort that contracting on quality cannot substitute for contracting on effort.
price:
e = e(0,X,Z) (1)
p = p(0,X,Z). (2)
In the second stage, the upstream firm chooses from the set of available contracts the one
that induces the agent to chose the principal's preferred price and effort given X and Z. For
any X and Z, there is a quality (effort level) and retail price that maximize upstream profits. It
is well-known that in the absence of contractual restraints, the downstream choice of price and
effort will diverge from this optimum if there are vertical or horizontal externalities'. In the
presence of externalities, the problem for the upstream firm is to design a contract for each asset
that maximizes upstream profit subject to the incentive compatibility constraints implied by
equations (1) and (2). In general, a contract might specify the terms on which inputs are
transferred from upstream, the level of effort required for observable dimensions, the retail price
when contracting on price is lawful, lump sum transfers and monitoring rights. The problem
facing the upstream firm can be written
max II(e *,p',X,Z),
0
where II(e) is upstream profit.
The contract is a function of asset characteristics because they determine the effect of
agent effort. If, for example, the asset is designed to insulate quality from the agent's choice
of effort (low X), the need for contractual controls for effort choice is reduced. On the other
hand, if quality is very sensitive to agent effort (high X), then the contract will make some
provisions for influencing the choice of effort. If an asset is characterized by output very
sensitive to observable effort (high X'), the contract will generally be more complex, specifying
agent behavior. If output is very sensitive to unobservable effort (high X2), a contract that
7 See Tirole (1988), Chapter 4 and the references therein.
provides incentives will be preferred. The profit-maximizing contract can be denoted
0 = 0(X,Z). (3)
In the first stage, asset characteristics will be chosen to maximize profit given Z, the set
of available contracts and the downstream decision problem. Market conditions summarized by
Z affect the optimal X. If, for example, final demand is highly sensitive to quality of a
particular type, an asset that can produce that quality would be chosen. Alternatively, if demand
is highly price elastic an asset that is cost efficient but perhaps limited in its quality potential
might be preferred. The profit-maximization problem can be written
max nI(0,e*,p',Z)
X
and is solved by
X = X(Z). (4)
3. VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN GASOLINE RETAILING
In the context of gasoline retailing, the upstream firm is the wholesaler and the agent is
the station operator. The wholesaler may be the refiner (e.g. Mobil or Shell) or a local
distributor who is supplied by the refiner. In principle, the presence of an intermediary between
refiners and operators might have some effect on observed choices and the empirical work takes
this into account. For simplicity, however, this discussion treats all wholesalers as refiners.
The asset is a gasoline station at some location, and its characteristics include whether
it sells non-gasoline products or services (e.g. automotive service or convenience store items),
its gasoline sales capacity, and whether it sells gasoline full-service, self-service or both. Market
conditions include the traffic volume at the station's location, demand elasticities (with respect
to price and quality), and the number, proximity and characteristics of competing retailers.
Operator effort might include hours of operation, the level of service provided at full-service
pumps, or supervision of repair service.
The contract can be conceptually decomposed into the "contractual form" and the
"contractual terms" both of which are included in the 0 notation. The form establishes the
rights of control, while the terms set the levels for variables for which control rights have been
allocated to the refiner. For example, the canonical franchise agreement reserves the choice of
franchise fee and wholesale price to the upstream firm, but allows the downstream firm to
choose retail price and effort. This allocation of control rights is the contractual form. The
terms are the particular franchise fee and wholesale price selected by the upstream firm.
There are three contractual forms used in gasoline retailing: company-owned, lessee-
dealer and open-dealer8 . Within each category, standard form contracts that vary across dealers
only in the contractual terms predominate9. For example, a refiner typically will reserve the
right to set station hours in all lessee-dealer contracts, but may assign different hours for
different stations.
Under open-dealer contracts, the land and the capital are owned by the station operator.
The refiner has no investment in the station. The contractual form allocates the control of the
wholesale price to the refiner. There is no rental or franchise fee. Decision rights over service
quality and retail price are allocated to the station operator. The only substantive constraints on
operator behavior are with respect to product purity and labeling. Operators, for example,
cannot sell gasoline supplied by some other refiner in pumps identified with the contracting
refiner and are required to monitor storage tanks for contamination and/or leakage. The
contracts also specify a minimum volume of gasoline the open-dealer operator must purchase.
However, the only penalty for failing to meet the minimum purchase requirement is termination
of the supply relationship. Because a terminated open-dealer operator can sign with another
supplier, this penalty is relatively mild.
8 The descriptions of contractual forms is based on conversations with refiners, wholesalers
and industry analysts and material in Nordhaus, et al. (1983), American Petroleum Institute
(1981) and Temple, Barker and Sloan (1988).
9 There may be some interstate variation in contractual forms in response to state laws on
franchising agreements.
At stations operated under lessee-dealer contracts, the land and most of the capital are
owned by the refiner. The operator is responsible for buying the initial inventory of gasoline
and other products"t . As in the open-dealer contract, the contractual form allocates control
over the wholesale price to the refiner. The refiner also sets an annual lease fee. In addition
to minimum purchase and product purity requirements, the lessee-dealer contract allocates
substantial quality control to the refiner; contracts can specify hours of operation, set cleanliness
and landscaping standards, define what types of non-gasoline products or services may be sold
on the premises, require the lessee to be on-site a specified amount of time and give the refiner
the right to inspect the station, observe operations and audit business records. The station
operator retains the right to set the retail price for all products.
The rental is station specific in the sense that it is set to reflect the volume of gasoline
sales: a good location for selling gasoline will have a higher rent than a bad location. However,
these rents do not extract all downstream profit. One reason for this is the return from ancillary
sales. Two stations in equally good locations with respect to gasoline demand and the same
capital for gasoline sales usually are charged the same rent even if one also has service bays to
provide automotive service and the other does not. Refiners may also charge a flat fee for
providing the capital for the ancillary service, but these fees are not station-specific. In the
above example, the refiner may charge the station with auto repair service a flat fee for each
service bay, but every station with repair bays will be charged the same fee"1 . The use of
standardized fees of this type is a common practice in franchise contracts in many industries
(Lafontaine, 1990).
Because not all rent is extracted, termination imposes a real penalty. Similarly, refusal
to renew the lease--which may have a term anywhere from one to ten years--is a real penalty.
1o Conversations with refiners and industry analysts suggest that the cost of building a new
station in the sample area was approximately 1 million dollars in 1987, and the cost of an initial
inventory for a station with automotive service was less than $250,000.
"1 The transfer value of lessee dealer stations is evidence that not all the downstream profit
is extracted. The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978 gives operators with lessee-dealer
contracts the right to sell the lease to another party (who must be approved by the lessor).
Leases have been sold for substantial sums; $100,000 to $300,000 are commonly cited as typical
of the range.
This means the refiner has a mechanism for enforcing quality standards and the minimum
purchase requirement. The circumstances under which ý lessee-dealer operator can be
terminated or not renewed are restricted by the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of
1978. While refiners can refuse to renew or terminate for failure to meet the terms of the lease,
they cannot refuse to renew or terminate at will. The refiner retains the right to alter the
station's characteristics without the consent of the dealer.
At stations operated under company-owned contracts, all capital investment is made by
the refiner, and the operator is employed by the refiner. All the control allocated to the
employer in standard employer-employee relationships is allocated to the refiner. In particular,
the refiner maintains ownership of the gasoline until it is sold to the consumer and therefore has
the right to set the retail price. This is the only contractual form under which the refiner can
directly set the retail price'". The operator is a salaried employee whose compensation package
may include an incentive scheme typically tied to the volume of sales.
The model assumes that the refiner chooses station characteristics, a reasonable
assumption at company-owned and lessee-dealer stations where the capital is owned by the
refiner and the contractual form allocates to the refiner substantial quality control rights. At
open-dealer stations this modeling approach is less immediately appealing. It can be supported,
however, by arguing that a refiner choosing to sign an open-dealer contract at a particular station
could have constructed an alternative station and supplied it as a company-owned or a lessee-
dealer operation. Given this option, the refiner will enter an open-dealer contract only if the
station characteristics are those he prefers given market conditions, and the station characteristics
are such that an open-dealer contract is preferred.
12 There is a long history of litigation with respect to resale price maintenance in gasoline
retailing. The courts have consistently held that refiners cannot set the retail price at any station
not operated by an employee. In particular, the courts have ruled that using a commission
contractual form under which legal title to the gasoline is retained by the refiner until sold to the
consumer but the operator is not an employee does not give the refiner the right to set the retail
price. See, for example, Simpson v. Union Oil Company, 377 U.S. 13, 17-18. It may not be
coincidental that the commission contractual form has virtually disappeared from gasoline
retailing subsequent to this ruling.
3.1 Contractual Form and Effort
Among the three contractual forms there are clear differences in the potential for directly
controlling effort and for providing performance incentives. The amount of direct effort control
allocated to the refiner is greatest with company-owned contracts and smallest with open-dealer
contracts. So for stations at which the more important effort dimensions are observable, the
company-owned contract should be attractive.
For unobservable effort, however, what matters is performance incentives. In this
dimension company-owned contracts are inferior to open and lessee-dealer contracts. When
greater operator effort increases the demand for gasoline, operators with lessee-dealer and open-
dealer contracts gain the mark-up over wholesale price for each additional gallon sold. Further,
for some non-gasoline products or services, these operators are true residual claimants.
In contrast, if the operator receives only a fixed salary at company-owned stations, there
is no mechanism for affecting unobserved effort. Some refiners, however, include an incentive
scheme in the compensation package for salaried operators. The extent to which this approach
is a good substitute for residual claimancy depends on what observable indicators of effort are
available. If a station sells only gasoline, an incentive scheme based only on gasoline volume
can be a good substitute for directly contracting on effort. Indeed, any readily metered product
or service can be easily incorporated into an incentive scheme. But then it is not correct to
claim these outputs involve unobservable effort, because there is some observable indicator that
is highly correlated with effort. Some services, however, are difficult to meter because the
output is hard to define or can be easily disguised by the operator. In this case, effort is
unobservable.
The relationship between optimal contractual form and station characteristics is
summarized in the diagram. When both observable and unobservable effort are important (high
X1 and high X2, respectively), lessee-dealer (LD) contracts will be preferred because this form
allows both control over observable quality and incentives for unobservable effort. With high
X' and low X2, the refiner should be indifferent between the lessee-dealer and company-owned
(CO) forms, both of which allow control of observable effort. In the opposing case (low X' and
high X2) the company-owned form is dominated, but the refiner will be indifferent between the
lessee and open-dealer (OD) forms. Finally, when effort has little effect on quality, the refiner
will be indifferent among the three forms. HIGH X2 LOW X2
A good example of a service that is
highly sensitive to unobservable effort is auto HIGH
repair. The quality of repair work is LD LD = CO
notoriously difficult to monitor; without on- X
site supervision by a manager with strong
incentives to produce high quality, shirking is LOW X LD = COLD = OD
unavoidable. For the same reason, it is OD
relatively easy for an operator to under-report
auto repair profit. An incentive scheme
based on output or profit is not feasible.
Residual claimancy through an open-dealer or
lessee-dealer contract is a superior mechanism for inducing optimal downstream choices.
Evidence supporting this argument is reported by Brickley and Dark, who find that among those
firms offering automotive repair, 96 percent of the outlets were operated as franchises rather
than as company-owned outlets.
Some non-gasoline output is less affected by unobservable dealer effort. Convenience
stores can be run in ways that remove those quality dimensions sensitive to unobservable effort
from the control of the operator. Inventory can be centrally planned, purchased, priced and
distributed. As a result, the effect of effort is reduced. Further, it is fairly easy to monitor the
quality dimensions her effort can influence: cleanliness, spoilage and stocking shelves, for
example. With many observable quality dimensions, refiners should prefer company-owned or
lessee-dealer contracts to open-dealer contracts for stations with convenience stores. With little
unobservable effort input by the operator, refiners may be indifferent between company-owned
and lessee-dealer contracts for convenience store stations. Finally, there may be some stations
at which operator effort has little effect on demand. A station that sells only self-service
gasoline, for example, requires only minimal operator input. At these stations, there is no
reason to suppose that one contractual form will be preferred to another on the basis of quality
control.
3.2 Contractual Form and Price
Contractual form will affect price as well as effort, and the ability to set price directly
at company-owned outlets may make this form attractive to refiners . Because a refiner's only
instrument for extracting downstream profit at open-dealer stations is the wholesale price, he will
set the wholesale price for those stations above his marginal cost. But because a refiner cannot
lawfully set station-specific wholesale prices, he must then charge a wholesale price above
marginal cost at all his stations. Even without this constraint, if extraction of downstream profit
through rental or other fixed fees is imperfect, charging a wholesale price above marginal cost
might maximize upstream profit. In either case, if downstream competition is imperfect, the
retail price decision of downstream agents will be affected by double marginalization: holding
effort constant, the price chosen by the downstream agent will be too high from the refiner's
point of view because the operator's marginal return to reducing retail price is less than the total
benefit of price minus unit production and retailing cost. When the agent chooses both effort
and price, it is clear that the price she chooses and the price the refiner would choose will not
be the same, but it is not possible to sign the difference without further information about final
demand and downstream competition. Here, however, the use of minimum purchase
requirements implies that the price chosen by the operator tends to be too high. In the absence
of quantity forcing, then, prices at company-owned outlets would be lower than prices at other
outlets.
Minimum purchase requirements will limit the pricing discretion of lessee-dealer
operators, and are commonly believed to be used for that purpose. They are not a substitute,
however, for setting price. Minimum purchase requirements are in effect over relatively long
periods of time and are not adjusted for minor changes in demand or supply conditions. As a
result they are set low enough to ensure the dealer will be able to meet them under a range of
conditions. Observed prices, therefore, could be higher at lessee-dealer and open-dealer outlets
than company-owned outlets despite the quantity forcing. This prediction is consistent with
claims made by open-dealer and lessee-dealer operators that company-owned stations charge
lower prices (USDOE, 1980). Barron and Umbeck (1984) also find that a small sample of
stations converted from company-owned contracts to some other contractual form charged prices
that were lower, relative to nearby stations, before the change in form. If the absence of a
strong enforcement mechanism reduces the effectiveness of quantity forcing at open dealerships,
prices at these outlets may be higher than prices at lessee-dealer outlets.
3.3 Open-Dealer Contracts Revisited
The preceding discussion implies that open-dealer contracts should never dominate both
company-owned and lessee-dealer contracts. If effort matters and any dimension is observable,
lessee-dealer contracts will strictly dominate open-dealer contracts. If effort is unimportant, the
superior price control available with company-owned contracts will lead refiners to prefer strictly
company-owned contracts to open-dealer contracts. Only in the unlikely circumstance that effort
matters but no dimension is observable will an open-dealer contract not be dominated by another
form. Evenr in this case, the refiner should be indifferent between the lessee and open-dealer
forms. Nonetheless, open-dealer contracts are common.
This apparent inconsistency arises from the assumption that the most profitable contract
for the refiner results in a non-negative refiner profit. This need not be the case. There will
be some locations at which even the best contract will not produce a normal return on the
refiner's investment in land and capital. If the investment is made by the operator, however,
it will be profitable for the refiner to supply gasoline to that station as long as his wholesale
mark-up on the quantity sold is higher than his cost of delivering the gas. This arrangement can
be profitable for the operator if there are downstream rents that cannot be extracted by the
refiner under any contract. Then the total profit at the station may be high enough to cover the
investment in land and capital even though the refiner's share under an alternative arrangement
would not be.
This situation will arise most commonly when a substantial share of the profits generated
at the station come not from gasoline sales but from sale of some ancillary product or service.
At a station of this type, the refiner's profit from gasoline sales (through the wholesale mark-up
plus the rent) will be relatively small. If rent extraction is imperfect for the ancillary service,
this additional income might not be sufficient to bring the total return to a normal level. The
operator, however, may find the ancillary service extremely profitable, especially when she gets
to retain the entire profit stream. Thus, stations that have a small gasoline sales capacity and
some ancillary service are more likely to be open-dealer stations.
Nearly all the stations in this country are built by gasoline suppliers rather than station
operators. Since refiners would not build stations that could not be run profitably under the best
contractual arrangement, these stations must have been profitable (at least in expectation) for the
refiner under lessee-dealer or company-owned contracts when they were built". Changes in
market conditions can subsequently make these stations unprofitable as a refiner investment,
leading him to sell to an open dealer' 4. Because these changes are more likely the longer the
station exists, open-dealer stations are also more likely to be older stations.
3.4 Summary of Predictions
If the primary concern of the refiner is controlling the downstream price, company-owned
stations would be the dominant form. When unobservable effort is important, however, the
refiner may trade control over price for effort incentives producing the mix in contractual form
actually observed. Within a mixed distribution system, the price at company-owned stores will
be different--and probably lower. If quantity forcing is more successful under lessee-dealer
contracts, prices at open-dealer stations will higher than prices at lessee-dealer stations.
The company-owned contract should be associated with stations designed to insulate
quality from unobservable effort thereby making the price advantage of this form relatively more
important. Stations selling gasoline self-service only and stations where the ancillary service is
a convenience store rather than automotive service should be good candidates for the company-
owned form. In contrast, the lessee-dealer form will be associated with stations where
unobservable effort is important. Stations with automotive service will be run more profitably
under a lessee-dealer contract than a company-owned contract.
Finally, if open-dealer stations are those at which refiner ownership is no longer
' In principle, a refiner could build stations he intends to sell immediately to an open dealer.
If refiner and operator have the same risk attitude and beliefs, the refiner could extract all future
profit through the sale price. This would be particularly attractive if the refiner has some
advantage in land acquisition and station construction. In fact, however, this is not a common
practice.
'" The federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978 requires that a refiner wishing to
cease operation of a lessee-dealer station offer to sell the station to the current lessee. The
refiner is not, however, obligated to supply the station after the sale.
profitable, these stations should be older on average than the stations owned by refiners. They
also may earn a substantial share of income from an ancillary service for which rent extraction
is imperfect, suggesting that the proportion of the station's capacity devoted to gasoline sales will
be lower at open-dealer stations.
4. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
Testing these predictions requires an econometric model that is responsive to the nature
of the decision problem and the limitations of the available data. The empirical work estimates
equations (2) and (3) taking into account the discrete nature of the observed contractual form
variable. Because the estimation strategy is affected by data availability, this section begins with
a description of the data and then specifies the empirical model and reports the results.
4.1 Data and Sample Characteristics
The data are from a cross-sectional census of all the gasoline stations in a four county
area in Eastern Massachusetts that includes the Boston metropolitan area"5. Data on station
location, ancillary services, gasoline brand, station capacity, service level (full or self) and
contract type are included for each. No relevant information on effort or demand characteristics
are available. Some information on market conditions can be constructed using the data on
station location. Although reported as a cross-section, data collection occurred over a twelve
week period in the first quarter of 1987, during which the wholesale prices of refined petroleum
products were slowly rising. To adjust for wholesale price changes, the retail prices have been
indexed using weekly fob wholesale price data for the Bc )n area'". Retail prices observed
in any given week are indexed by the average wholesale price reported at the end of the
preceding week. The analysis is restricted to branded stations: Shell, Exxon, Amoco, Gulf,
Mobil, Citgo, Texaco and Chevron in this sample. Descriptive statistics for the branded stations
15 There are a total of 1527 stations in the four county area. The analysis omits stations
in a subset of the outlying areas, reducing the sample to 1489 stations of which 1130 are branded
stations.
16 The station-level data were collected by Lundberg Surveys, Incorporated. The wholesale
price data are from Oil Price Information Service.
are reported in Table 1.
Approximately 43 percent of the branded stations are operated as lessee-dealer outlets and
about five percent are operated as company-owned outlets. This area has a lower proportion of
company-owned stations than the national average. Nationally, major refiners were selling over
fourteen percent of their product through company-owned outlets in 1987; in the sample area
company-owned outlets were selling less than eight percent of the branded output (USDOE,
1987). This sample also contains a higher proportion of full-service only stations and a lower
proportion of self-service only stations than the national average. By the late 1980s, less than
one fifth of all branded U.S. stations were full-service only, down from more than two thirds
in the late 1970s. Yet in 1987, two-thirds of the branded stations in the Boston area were full-
service only. Over forty percent of U.S. stations were self-service only by the late 1980s, up
from less than five percent in the early 1980s, while only about twelve percent of the sampled
stations are self-service only (National Petroleum News, various issues)."
The data are generally consistent with the predicted relationships between station
characteristics and contractual form. A much higher proportion of company-owned stations are
self-service only. When company-owned stations provide non-gasoline services they are less
likely to provide auto repair ("Repair") and more likely to have convenience stores ("Cstore")
than other stations. Company-owned stations also tend to be located in outlying areas more
often. Eighty-seven percent of the company-owned stations are located more than ten miles
from the center of Boston ("Outlying Location"). These locations may have lower land costs
and--since they have been developed more recently--probably have a newer station stock.
Perhaps because they are more often located in geographically outlying areas, the average
company-owned station faces less competition from nearby stations. The "nearby capacity"
variable sums the number of cars that can be served simultaneously at other stations located
within a one mile radius of the station.
The data on open-dealer stations are consistent with the view that they are small capacity,
older stations not intensively involved in gasoline sales. The average open-dealer station has less
17 A few of the many towns in the sample area have ordinances restricting self-service
gasoline. If these ordinances are more common in this area than they are nationwide, they may
explain some of the divergence from the national averages.
gasoline sales capacity; it is large enough to serve only 3.5 cars at the same time ("Capacity"),
compared to five cars at the other stations. In fact, nearly three quarters of the open-dealer
stations have only one gasoline island while no more than thirty percent of the other stations are
single island. In large part because of this capacity difference, open-dealer stations have a
smaller proportion of their available space devoted to gasoline sales: the intensity variable is the
ratio of capacity to lot size and is lowest at open-dealer stations. These stations sell
approximately half the volume sold by lessee-dealer and company-owned outlets. The data on
investment indicate little recent activity at open-dealer stations. Less than forty percent of the
open-dealer stations have been remodeled within the three years preceding data collection
compared to over two thirds of the other stations ("Remodel") 8.
The price data do not reveal a clear relationship between price levels and contractual
form. Prices are reported by gasoline grade (regular leaded, regular unleaded and premium
unleaded) and service level (full-service and self-service). Some stations offer cash discounts.
The prices used in the analysis are the lowest prices for the specified grade and service level
offered by the station. Not all stations carry all grades.
4.2 Estimation and Results: Price Equation
The retail price equation defines the operator's choice of price given the contractual
form, the asset characteristics and the relevant market conditions. Because all the variables
affecting her choice are exogenous, the equation can be estimated by ordinary least squares. The
estimating equation for the price at the jth station is
m-1
Pi = P0 + 1Xi + 6,101 + 820, + 7 +1; ' 72'Zf + E LPV + ej. (5)hl
where 01 is a dummy variable for a company-owned station, 02 is a dummy variable for an
open-dealer station and D,, h=1,..,m, are dummy variables for the m refiners supplying the
,1 The data record whether or not the station was remodeled within the specified time
period, not what was done. Remodeling can include anything from rebuilding the station to
adding a canopy over the pumps.
stations in this sample. The 0 variable in equation (2) includes both the contractual form and
the contractual terms. Price will be affected by both, but only form is observed" by the
econometrician. One of the most important terms affecting the choice of retail price is the
wholesale price. However, since the wholesale price cannot vary across stations of the same
brand, unobserved variation in transfer pricing will be captured by the refiner fixed effects and
therefore will not bias the coefficient estimates in equation (5). The Z, vector includes observed
market conditions: nearby rival capacity and outlying location. Unobserved market conditions,
-2, are part of the error term, and may bias the least square estimates of the contractual form
effects. This problem is addressed following the presentation of the least squares results.
Equation (5) is a reduced form, and the coefficients will reflect the total effect of the
exogenous variables on price: the direct effect and the indirect effect through changes in effort.
By construction, the coefficient on 0, (02) is an estimate of the increment to price observed at
company-owned (open-dealer) stations compared to the price at lessee-dealer stations. If there
were no feedback from effort to price, the double marginalization effect would imply the
company-owned coefficient would be negative (6, < 0) and the open-dealer coefficient will be
non-negative (62 >_ 0). If there are significant indirect effects, however, the signs of the
coefficients cannot be predicted. In this case, the coefficient provides information on the total
effect of contractual form on price, but it is incorrect to interpret it as an estimate of only the
direct effect. The coefficients of interest are those on the contractual form variables, but the
same argument applies to the other exogenous variables: station and market characteristics will
have a direct effect on price and an indirect effect through changes in effort.
The ordinary least squares estimates reported in Table 2 display substantial variation
across gasoline grades and service types. For leaded products, there are no clear contractual
form effects. ThE estimated coefficients are quite small (less than a cent), but imprecisely
measured. For unleaded products, the coefficients are consistently negative for the company-
owned variable, indicating that prices are one to three and a half cents lower. The coefficient
19 "Observable" is a term reserved for distinguishing those things that can be contracted on;
"observed" is used to distinguish what the econometrician can measure given the data.
estimates, however, can be statistically distinguished from zero2" only for premium unleaded,
full-service gasoline. The pattern for open-dealer stations is'less clear. The magnitude of the
effect for full-service gasoline is small and cannot be bounded from zero. The only large effect
is for premium, unleaded self-service where the coefficient implies that open-dealer stations
charge over a cent more than lessee dealers, but all open-dealer coefficients have relatively large
standard errors.
The estimates in Table 2 may be affected by the mix of supplier types in the sample.
The discussion has treated all suppliers as refiners, but nearly twenty percent of the stations are
supplied by local wholesalers. The data do not identify individual local suppliers, but industry
sources report that wholesalers in New England may supply from less than ten to more than one
hundred stations. These wholesalers use the same contractual forms as refiners and the larger
ones may behave very much like refiners. There may be variation in contracts across
wholesalers, however, that cannot be removed with refiner fixed effects. In addition,
wholesalers may supply stations carrying different brands.
Table 3 reports the results from restricting the sample to stations that are supplied directly
by refiners. The contractual form results of Table 2 are reinforced. The estimates of the
company-owned coefficients for unleaded products remain negative and are larger in absolute
value. The average company-owned effect is -2.75 here, compared to -1.72 when all suppliers
are included. In addition, the coefficient on regular unleaded self-service can now also be
statistically bounded away from zero. Nonetheless, the estimates are still imprecise on average:
the standard error of the average company-owned effect is 1.42. The absolute magnitude of the
coefficients for open-dealer stations tend to be smaller here and no coefficient can be bounded
from zero.
Among the other coefficients, the most interesting is the estimated effect of rival
capacity. Increasing nearby capacity to serve an additional car reduces price by less than one
tenth of a cent, but the effect is persistent and precisely estimated. If the number of nearby
stations is substituted for the nearby capacity variable, the (unreported) estimates suggest that
price also decreases in the number of nearby rivals. These results are consistent with the pricing
prediction of simple spatial competition models: as the number of firms in a given market
20 All references to statistical significance are assessed at the .05 level or better.
increase, the average price will decline.
The coefficients on the remaining variables change across grades and service levels. In
general, station characteristics appear to affect full-service prices more than self-service prices.
This may be because the quality of full-service has more unobserved variation than the quality
of self-service. Full-service prices increase when the station offers both full and self-service
gasoline ("Split Island") 21. Recent remodeling and offering automotive repair tend to decrease
full-service prices. At some "self-service" pumps, a station worker pumps the gas but will not
provide any other service usually associated with full-service. These "Mini- service" sales are
priced higher than real self-service.
The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 are unbiased if the unobserved market characteristics (Z2)
in the error term are uncorrelated with the observed station characteristics. This assumption is
rather strong, however. Consider, for example, variations in consumer income that lead to high
demand for service and unwillingness to search for low prices. The service demand will lead
refiners to choose full-service through equation (4). Income will also have a direct effect on
prices through the search component: holding service constant, higher income implies higher
prices. Income, then, will be in the vector Z2. Because it is correlated with full-service, the
coefficient estimates will be biased.
While the market characteristic data necessary to avoid bias in the estimates is
unavailable, another approach to controlling for market characteristics is possible. Any group
of stations within a small geographic area should face similar market characteristics. Because
station locations are known, it is possible to use this information to estimate contractual form
effects within small areas. To implement this approach, station addresses are converted to
cartesian coordinates. Each company-owned station becomes the center for a geographic area,
and each station within one cartesian mile of that station is identified. For the kth group of
stations, there are two price equations (for each grade and service level): one for the station that
is company-owned and one for the nearby stations that are not. A within area average is
constructed for the non-company-owned stations and subtracted from the company-owned
equation. The result are k= 1,..,r equations
21 The effect of offering both full and self service gasoline on full service prices is
investigated in Shepard (1990) where it is attributed to second degree price discrimination.
(Pkl - fk2) = 10 + ;l(Xkl - X) + l'k
where r is the number of company-owned stations, p,l is the price at the kth company-owned
station and /, (Xk) is the average price (station characteristic) for the non-company-owned
stations. The common market characteristics (Z) are removed by differencing. Then if
company-owned stations charge different prices, the constant term will reflect that difference.
Notice that refiner fixed effects are not well-defined in this context and are not in the estimating
equation. Unreported results show that this omission does not substantively change the reported
coefficient estimates in Tables 2 and 3.
These within area estimates are presented in Table 4 for all branded stations and lend
some support to the impression from the earlier estimation that company-owned stores charge
somewhat lower prices for unleaded products22. While these estimates are no longer
consistently negative, the only large effects--those for full-service--are negative. The only
coefficient large enough to be statistically distinguished from zero is, again, the effect on prices
for premium unleaded gas sold full-service. For this product, prices at company-owned stores
are at least eight cents per gallon lower. The magnitude of the contractual form results appear
to be sensitive to excluding other explanatory variables. In particular, if "Repair" and "Cstore"
are omitted, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates and standard errors are smaller for the
full-service prices. The basic pattern, however, is preserved: the larger effects are negative and
the implied reduction in price for full-service premium is at least six cents.
Notice that the test here is particularly stringent. Suppose company-owned outlets do
choose lower prices in response to any given market situation. These lower prices will induce
lower prices at nearby stations. Thus, the measured effect is not the amount by which company-
owned stations reduce their prices from the equilibrium price that would prevail in their absence,
but the difference in price that survives the competitive response by rivals. The row of Table
22 The estimation is weighted least squares where the weights reflect the number of
observations underlying the averages. The resulting covariance matrix is homoskedastic.
Because any given station can appear in more than one area, the errors also can be correlated
across markets. Fortunately, duplicate observations can be identified and used to construct
appropriate weights to generate correct standard errors. It is the corrected standard errors that
appear in Table 4.
4 labeled "No. Areas" reports the number of company-owned stations on which the estimates
are based and the row labeled "No. Stations" reports the total number of stations on which the
estimates are based. For example, of the 38 company-owned stations selling regular unleaded
gas self-service, 25 have at least one non-company owned station within one mile also selling
regular unleaded gas self-service. Across all twenty-five areas, there are 87 stations selling
unleaded gas self-service. But this means that most of the 314 stations selling this grade self-
service do not have a company-owned store nearby. The average differences reported in Tables
2 and 3, therefore, are based primarily on a comparison of company-owned stations with other
stations that do not compete with these hypothetically low-priced stations. One might expect,
then, to find the estimated effects more pronounced in Table 2. The fact that the within area
effects are not smaller suggests that controlling for local effects eliminates important sources of
variation in retail pricing.
4.3 Estimation and Results: The Contract Equation
In equation (3) the contract is treated as a continuous variable representing both the
contractual form and the contractual terms. But only contractual form is observed, and observed
form choices are discrete. A standard approach to estimation based on observed, discrete
choices is to model a latent variable, 1I(0(X,Z)i) in this case: the profit earned by the refiner
at a station with characteristics X and market conditions Z when the ith contractual form is
chosen, i= 1,2,3, and terms are set optimally. Then the observed variables Oi can be defined
0, = 1 if H(O0) = max(H(0,),II(02),H(0 3)) (6)
0i = 0 otherwise.
Let
m-i
n(0),j we + cnaXu + isch+ on + i h + (7)h,1
be the profit at station j when contractual form i is chosen. Then if v has an extreme value
distribution, the relationship between choice probabilities and asset characteristics and market
conditions can be estimated using a multinomial logit specification.
Equation (4), defining the optimal station characteristics, is not estimated, but its presence
clarifies the assumptions necessary to identify the contractual form equation. Since Z2 is
unobserved and X is a function of Z, the way equation (4) is written implies that X will be
correlated with the composite error: 0 2'Z2 + v. The identifying restriction, then, is that
contractual form is not a function of market conditions: 01 = 52 = 0. This is clearly an
untenable assumption for contract terms. The level of a fixed fee in a franchise contract, for
example, will be a function of demand parameters. Here, however, the estimated contract
equation involves only contractual form and the identifying restriction applies only to the choice
of form.
The decision-making process implicit in the identifying restriction is as follows: the
refiner chooses station characteristics to maximize profit given market conditions and the
available contracts. He then chooses the contractual form that will, when terms are set
optimally, induce the profit-maximizing effort and price choices for a station with those
characteristics. Finally he chooses the contract terms that, given the station's characteristics,
market conditions and the allocation of control rights established by the contractual form, will
induce the preferred downstream behavior. The critical step in this argument is that market
conditions affect the choice of contractual terms but not the choice of contractual form.
The multinomial logit specification implies a particularly simple form for the probability
ratios. Let the arbitrarily chosen normalization category be lessee-dealer contracts and k = 1,2
denote the other categories. Then the ratio of the probability that the kth form is chosen to the
probability that the lessee-dealer form is chosen at station j is simply
(O0k + a (/Xj + Vkj)
e
The estimated coefficients can therefore be interpreted as the percentage change in the log of this
odds ratio. These estimates are reported in Table 5. In columns one and two the estimated
coefficients are reported for the ratio of company-owned (co) to lessee-dealer (d) and the ratio
of open-dealer (od) to lessee-dealer, respectively. The implicit estimates of the coefficients for
the ratio of company-owned to open-dealer are reported in column three. The estimates reported
in the first three columns use observations on all the branded stations. Estimates for
observations restricted to stations directly supplied by refiners appear in columns four through
six.
The results for the primary ancillary services are consistent with the model's predictions.
The coefficients for repair imply a reduction in the probability that the station will be company-
owned relative to both other forms when auto service is provided. This result fits the prediction
that the company-owned form will not be optimal when the ancillary sgrvice involves substantial
unobserved effort. In contrast, the presence of a convenience store increases the probability that
the station will be operated as a company-owned outlet. Convenience stores have a much higher
ratio of observable to unobservable effort, making them better candidates for company-owned
contracting. The model has no prediction with respect to the relationship between auto repair
and the refiner's relative preference for open-dealer versus lessee-dealer contracts, but both
coefficients are negative--significantly so for the sample including all branded stations. Thus,
auto repair may increase the relative probability that the station will be operated under a lessee-
dealer contract. If refiners choose a contractual form that allows for explicit control of
observable quality when it is important, cstores should also increase the probability of operation
as a lessee-dealer rather than open-dealer station. The empirical support for this hypothesis is
somewhat less strong: The coefficients have the expected sign but are not sufficiently precise
to be statistically distinguished from zero.
As predicted, an increase in the intensity with which station capacity is used for gasoline
sales reduces the probability that the station is operated under an open-dealer contract. When
the portion of the lot devoted to ancillary services increases, the revenue the refiner can extract
from gasoline sales declines, making the station a less attractive investment. The data not
clearly support the argument that stations selling only self-service gasoline are more likely to be
run under company-owned contracts. No full service does reduce the probability that the station
is operated as an open-dealer outlet, but the effect on the probability of company-owned versus
lessee-dealer is not clear cut. In both cases the coefficients have the predicted signs, but the
magnitude is too small to distinguish from zero.
The predictive power of the model is reasonably good. The percent of stations for which
the estimates imply a probability of 50% or more for the actual contractual form is slightly more
than seventy percent for both sample definitions. In contrast, predictions from randomizing
based only on the observed proportions of each contractual form would be correct for only 47
percent of the stations. Simply assigning each station to the most commonly observed category
would increase the number of correct predictions to only 52 percent.
Although the results reported in Table 5 are generally consistent with the theory invoked
in Section 2, they support reduced form predictions that might also be consistent with other
theories. In particular, one competing explanation of the observed patterns might be that
ownership reflects only station age. Refiners report that they sometimes operate a new (or
newly rebuilt) station as a company-owned outlet initially and then convert to lessee-dealer. This
practice might allow the refiner to get information on the true profitability of the station so that
lease terms could be set optimally. As an artifact of the historical development of gasoline
retailing, new stations are more likely to have convenience stores than are older stations.
Similarly, recently opened station are more likely to be self-service only and less likely to have
service bays. In conjunction with the age-related arguments made for open-dealer stations, this
explanation is consistent with the pattern observed in Table 5. Some support for this view also
comes from Table 1, where it is clear that company-owned stations are more likely to be in
outlying areas where the station stock is probably newer on average. The remodel variable was
included in the Table 5 regressions to control for newly rebuilt stations, but the variable is far
from an ideal indicator of station ageu.
There is no measure of station age in the data set, but there is a way to develop a rough
categorization for a subsample of the data. The company at conducted the 1987 survey has
conducted previous surveys in the Boston area and has maintained consistent station identification
numbers over successive surveys. This identifier includes the year the station was first
observed. There are two problems with this as an indicator of age. First, the earliest survey
was in 1972 and surveys have been performed only irregularly since that time. So a first
observation at the next sample period, 1975, does not allow precise dating of the station. In
23 If a station has been recently rebuilt--to convert service bays to a convenience store, for
example--this activity will be reflected in remodel. However, stations are remodeled--without
changing their basic character--when they are old. Remodel may, in fact, indicate that the
station is old, not new.
addition, not all areas in the current sample were included in each survey. Indeed, the area
surveyed appears to have changed somewhat with each survey. However, towns appear to be
a common unit of observation. That is, if some stations in a town are surveyed, all stations in
the town are typically surveyed.
To test for age effects, an indicator variable for older stations was constructed. First,
all towns that had no station first observed before 1979 was dropped from the sample. All
remaining stations, then, are presumably in towns where they would have been observed had
they existed prior to 1980. Among these, stations are classified as "Old" if they existed in the
1970s24. The regressions reported in Table 5 were then rerun for this subsample with the
additional dummy variable for old stations. The results are in Table 6.
Although the coefficients change somewhat compared to the full-sample results in Table
5, controlling for age does not substantively change the results, except perhaps for the
convenience store coefficients. It is no longer true that convenience stores significantly separate
company-owned from lessee-dealer outlets. However, it remains the case that, unlike repair
service, convenience stores do not increase the probability that the outlet will be managed under
a lessee-dealer contract relative to a company-owned contract. These results make a stronger
statement about the apparent misfit between open-dealer forms and convenience stores and the
tendency for stations that are less intensively used for gasoline sales to be operated under open-
dealer contracts. Any changes in the results compared to Table 5, however, are not the result
of the age variable. Old does a poor job of discriminating among contractual forms and omitting
it from the equation has almost no effect on the other coefficients.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical results generally confirm the well-known theoretical result that the nature
of the vertical contract matters even when there are no relationship specific assets. Upstream
firms offer contracts that allocate control in ways that best align the incentives and opportunities
of downstream agents with upstream interests. Contractual forms well-suited to providing
I While the choice of 1980 was dictated by data availability, it also coincides with the end
of price and allocation controls in place during the 1970s. It is commonly believed that these
controls inhibited the rationalization of the retail distribution system observed in the 1980s.
incentives are used when the downstream production process is importantly affected by
unobservable agent choices. Conversely, forms well-suited to detailed, direct control are chosen
when important downstream choices are observable and contractible. Further the data provide
some support for the hypothesis that contractual form affects pricing, particularly that prices will
be lower when the upstream firm can directly control price.
While the insights provided by general principal-agent models have been confirmed, the
analysis has also rested on a fairly detailed analysis of the contractual and institutional
framework particular to gasoline retailing. This level of specificity may raise the usual issues
about how broadly the results can be applied. But the specificity is also appropriate to the
theory. Contracts are written when the relationship is sufficiently complex to warrant imposing
rights different from those of the spot market. These complexities involve the nature of the
relationship and the institutional context within which the firms operate.
One of the contracting issues of considerable theoretic and empirical interest not
addressed is identifying the determinants of the set of contractual forms. This paper has taken
this set as given, but it is not obvious that these three forms include the optimal contract for any
given station. Indeed, it is easy to imagine alternative forms that might better protect the
principal's interests. For example, it is possible in principle to have separate contracts for
managing auto repair and gasoline sales at the same station thereby unbundling services with
very different control issues. A limited set of observed contracts are nonetheless common in
many industries. It is difficult to provide a consistent theoretical justification for restricting the
feasible set of contracts. Perhaps these limitations are a response to transaction costs or legal
concerns involving equity that mitigate against otherwise optimal contract customization. In any
case, further empirical investigation is warranted.
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Company Lessee Open Total
Owned Dealer Dealer
Some Full Service (%) 45.45 84.60 96.26 88.76
Full Service Only (%) 29.09 48.46 89.12 68.67
Repair (%) 25.45 84.80 86.73 82.92
Cstore (%) 45.45 9.03 3.91 8.14
Remodel (%) 80.00 68.38 38.27 53.27
Outlying Location (%) 87.27 57.91 58.84 59.82
Capacity 5.44 4.97 3.50 4.23
(2.19) (1.95) (1.67) (1.97)
Monthly Gas Vol. 97.96 81.83 43.98 62.92
(x 1000 gal) (47.92) (39.34) (27.35) (39.57)
Intensity 0.45 0.39 0.32 0.36
(0.27) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
Nearby Capacity 22.42 29.72 31.11 30.09
(16.88) (22.18) (26.02) (24.10)
Price Reg. Leaded 76.28 74.89 76.11 75.26
Self (2.58) (4.05) (5.05) (4.16)
Price Reg. Leaded 82.94 84.86 81.59 83.02
Full (10.61) (9.47) (7.97) (8.85)
Price Reg. Unleaded 80.11 80.84 83.24 81.19
Self (3.75) (4.7" (5.32) (4.83)
Price Reg. Unleaded 90.65 92.69 88.97 90.55
Full (11.65) (10.35) (9.13) (9.86)
Price Prem. Unleaded 93.52 94.57 98.33 95.13
Self (5.34) (5.91) (5.76) (6.02)
Price Prem. Unleaded 101.24 106.27 103.47 104.59
Full (7.67) (9.77) (9.48) (9.70)
Number of Stations 55 487 588 1130























































0.193 0.408 0.316 0.353 0.410
Standard errors in parentheses
































































































































































































Rsquare 0.178 0.442 0.321 0.400 0.415
Standard errors in parentheses















































































































































































































LR test statistic (22 df)
"McFadden's pseudo rsquare
Standard errors in parentheses






















































































































"LR test statistic (22 df)
"McFadden's pseudo rsquare
Standard errors in parentheses
Includes refiner fixed effects
In pr(od)
pr(ld)
-1.33
(0.40)
-0.47
(0.34)
-0.72
(0.46)
-2.81
(0.58)
0.21
(0.20)
In pr(co)
pr(od)
2.27
(0.58)
-0.95
(0.55)
1.62
(0.62)
4.41
(0.99)
-0.44
(0.44)
739
337.62
-577.49
299.97
-471.80
0.264 0.334
